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Lessons from the organisation of the UK medical
services deployed in support of Operation TELIC
(Iraq) and Operation HERRICK (Afghanistan)
Martin C M Bricknell,1 M Nadin2
ABSTRACT
This paper provides the definitive record of the UK
Defence Medical Services (DMS) lessons from the organ-
isation of medical services in support of Operation (Op)
TELIC (Iraq) and Op HERRICK (Afghanistan). The analysis
involved a detailed review of the published academic lit-
erature, internal post-operational tour reports and post-
tour interviews. The list of lessons was reviewed through
three Military Judgement Panel cycles producing the
single synthesis ‘the golden thread’ and eight ‘silver
bullets’ as themes to institutionalise the learning to
deliver the golden thread. One additional theme, men-
toring indigenous healthcare systems and providers,
emerged as a completely new capability requirement.
The DMS has established a programme of work to
implement these lessons.
INTRODUCTION
This paper provides a summary of lessons from the
organisation of medical services in support of
Operation (Op) TELIC (Iraq) and Op HERRICK
(Afghanistan) covering the period from February
2003 to November 2014. The achievement of the
best possible clinical outcomes for our patients was
the product of synergy between the chain of
command, medical organisation and excellent clin-
ical practice. This paper, by interpreting how
medical services were organised, complements the
clinical lessons that are the main feature of the mul-
tiple academic publications by Defence Medical
Services (DMS) clinicians.
SCOPE AND METHOD
This paper is based on material already in the
public domain, primarily scholarly articles already
published in medical journals, however other gov-
ernment publications have been cited, notably
those produced by Defence Statistics (Health). No
new primary research has been undertaken and
thus the evidence set is affected by the relative
paucity of material on the DMS organisation in
Iraq compared with Afghanistan. The focus is on
deployed medical services and does not capture the
lessons from providing healthcare for wounded,
sick or injured service personnel from these opera-
tions after their return to the UK in the Role 4
pathway. Lessons published by other nations from
within the military coalition in both theatres or
from the clinical care of Iraqi or Afghan casualties
are not considered.
This article is structured around the medical
lessons at Chapter 4-2 of the Op HERRICK
Campaign Study published in March 2015; a
redacted version of this document was released to
the public domain in January 2016 as a result of a
Freedom of Information request.1 The Health
Services Support element of the study was tasked
directly to the Army Medical Directorate, but a
Joint approach was adopted and the breadth of the
DMS were consulted and participated in the ana-
lysis, including significant contributions through
the Defence Consultant Advisors (DCAs) and
Professors, the medical staffs in the operational
headquarters and both Royal Navy and Royal Air
Force Medical Services. While undertaken towards
the end of Op HERRICK, the analysis represented
a culmination of organisational knowledge accrued
over the preceding decade.
The analysis was initiated with a literature
review, focused on Op HERRICK post-operational
reports, Commanders’ post-operational interview
transcripts and articles published within peer-
reviewed journals. Several hundred lessons and
observations were assimilated and circulated for
review by a DMS-wide audience that included the
DCAs and Professors, who were requested to add
their own lessons and observations. Further con-
solidation followed, leading to a Joint senior level
Military Judgement Panel (MJP), which reviewed
240 lessons, identified the top third and consoli-
dated these into 23 lessons and themes. The 23
lessons were forwarded for consideration by a
selected panel of 40 Op HERRICK medical Subject
Matter Experts (SME), who were individuals who
held Op HERRICK assignments as a Commander
Medical, Deployed Medical Director, Brigade
Senior Medical Officer, Commanding Officer (CO)
of the Bastion Role 3 Hospital or the medical regi-
ment, DCAs, Defence Professors, CO of the Royal
Centre for Defence Medicine, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) Medical Adviser and
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principal Joint and single Service Medical Staff Officers. These
senior individuals had all completed Op HERRICK-related
assignments and were requested to provide insights based on
their own Op HERRICK experiences. Given the length of the
campaign, many had undertaken multiple deployments on Op
HERRICK and also undertaken assignments in direct support of
the operation. Thirty SMEs responded, producing 80 additional
insights and observations, bringing significant richness to the
data and permitting detailed triangulation of lessons and prac-
tices. The insights and observations were mapped against the 23
lessons and taken forward for consideration by a senior six
member MJP. This panel reviewed the lessons and made further
consolidation, resulting in the list contained herein that are
definitive lessons of the DMS.
The principal insight is based on a narrative from the multi-
tude of lessons, observations and insights that encapsulates the
UK military medical endeavour and development over 8 years.
The MJP also identified nine themes that require actions or
work to retain, institutionalise or support this narrative. Each
individual theme has been amplified by reference to academic
papers published in the public domain and the method for sub-
sequent implementation of these lessons into changes to organ-
isation or practice is summarised in italics.
THE NARRATIVE: THE SYNTHESIS OF LESSONS,
OBSERVATIONS AND INSIGHTS
The standard of healthcare delivered on Op TELIC and Op
HERRICK, and resultant patient outcomes, provides the base-
line that the DMS aspire to deliver on future operations. This
performance was the result of the Operational Patient Care
Pathway (OPCP)2 being managed as a single and coherent
end-to-end healthcare system, from point of injury to the home
base (Role 4). There is robust clinical evidence of cumulative
improvement in the probability of survival of the UK military
casualties3 and the trauma system was regarded as exemplary by
the Care Quality Commission.4 It is recognised however, that
constraints (political, operational, tactical and financial) may
prevent its future achievement. Should such risk be identified by
medical planners, it must be highlighted to operational com-
manders in order that it is properly mitigated, or tolerated as an
explicit decision.
The DMS OPCP uses consultant delivered healthcare as
routine, which is an enhancement over the UK NHS practice. It
specifically encourages rapid and effective decision making and
exploits senior clinical leadership for every seriously injured
patient—expressed quite simply, ‘seniority saves lives’. The evo-
lution of that ‘end-to-end’ system arose from developments in
clinical concepts, practice and governance that have been
described in the medical literature relating to the medical
experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. These step changes arose
from a combination of detailed scrutiny of every serious injury
or fatality, an improved understanding of wounding mechanisms
and pathophysiology and research into the treatment of blast
and ballistic trauma. This has driven advances in personal and
vehicle protective systems alongside the training and education
of deploying clinicians and the development of innovative clin-
ical practices. Financial investment led to better clinical infra-
structure, clinical equipment (diagnostic and treatment) and
greater availability of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicop-
ters crewed with physician-led patient retrieval teams. The NHS
played a vital role in the partnered provision of Role 4 health-
care for military casualties on return to the UK, with import-
antly, Defence also providing uniformed administrative and
welfare support within the Queen Elizabeth Hospital,
Birmingham. The NHS remains a key strategic partner for the
Ministry of Defence (MOD) to maintain an appropriately pre-
pared pool of military secondary healthcare (SHC) staff at readi-
ness to deploy on operations.
These clinical gains were underpinned by significant enhance-
ments in training, equipment and MEDEVAC. Such enhance-
ments may not be available during the early stages of future
operations because of constraints on our ability to move medical
mass; competing priorities for use of helicopters may restrict
their availability for MEDEVAC and the current limited environ-
mental tolerance of some key clinical equipment. These
enhancements within a new theatre of operations will have to
be built incrementally as the capacity of the Joint Supply Chain
allows and the theatre matures. Consequently, our clinical
research should be directed towards the following goals:
▸ The development of miniaturised and ruggedised imaging
and laboratory capability that has better tactical transport-
ability and environmental tolerance and reduces logistic drag,
and which may offer the use of imaging and laboratory
support forward of field hospitals.
▸ The development of clinical interventions and protocols that
enhance our ability to sustain patients more effectively
during prolonged field care if medical planning timelines
cannot be met.
The primary organisational lessons have been captured in the
new concept—the Operational Patient Care Pathway. This has
been incorporated into medical doctrine, and the UK national
medical doctrine has been merged with NATO medical doctrine
as a single publication.5
MEDICAL STATISTICS AND WORKLOAD
Data are essential to the analysis of performance of any medical
system. The military medical system is unique in that it operates
under single organisational direction and so it is possible to
direct the collection and collation of medical information from
point of wounding to ultimate retirement of a service person.
The system for collating the routine, paper-based reports from
medical units that provided the basis for the medical statistics
volumes of the Official Histories for the First and Second World
Wars6 7 had decayed to such an extent that in 2003 there was
no single institutional mechanism for the collation of medical
data from operations. The collection of data to support the stat-
istical and epidemiological evidence of the performance of the
military health system evolved during the two campaigns.
Initially the data were presented as case series collated by
medical personnel during their operational tours in individual
medical units.8–10 This evolved into systematic data collection
based on the Operational Emergency Department Admission
Record, in which the data from all admission log books from
field hospitals were collated into a single electronic database
thus creating the first registry of all admissions to field hospi-
tals.11 Data on all trauma cases admitted to field hospitals were
captured in a standardised data form and incorporated into the
Joint Theatre Trauma Register ( JTTR),12 which was initially
managed by RCDM, but as the requirement for MOD official
medical statistics emerged, the JTTR transferred to Defence
Statistics (Health). The JTTR has provided a rich source of data
for analysis, including analysis of those who died of their
wounds,13 the management of paediatric casualties,14 the use of
tourniquets,15 outcomes from massive blood transfusion16 and
to benchmark clinical outcomes against the UK national per-
formance data.17
Defence Statistics (Health) developed further datasets to
capture information on military casualties including the
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Defence Patient Tracking System, the Complex Trauma
Database and the Prosthetics Database. Additional information
on the performance on the military health system has been
derived from the Wounded, Injured and Sick Management
Information System, the notification of casualties system and
the Joint Personnel Administration system. From these datasets,
Defence Statistics (Health) has produced a series of publica-
tions that capture the statistical record of the deaths, injuries
and medical care episodes from Op TELIC and Op
HERRICK.
There were 178 deaths (135 due to hostile action and 43
from other causes) and 17 traumatic amputations during Op
TELIC and 456 deaths (405, 51)/275 amputations during Op
HERRICK.18 19 There is no specific analysis of field hospital
activity for Op TELIC, but from the opening of the UK field
hospital in Afghanistan on 1 April 2006 until the closure of Op
HERRICK on 30 November 2014, 7800 UK service personnel
and civilians were admitted to a field hospital; 7601 of these
were the UK service personnel of which 4220 were the result of
injuries and 3347 the result of natural causes. Of the 4220
admissions, approximately half were battle injuries (BI) and half
were non-battle injuries (NBI). Just under half (1982) of the
patients admitted to the field hospital with injuries required
the activation of the UK trauma team and approximately half of
the injuries sustained by the UK Armed Forces trauma patients
were to the extremities, with the largest number of injuries sus-
tained to the knee and lower leg. Injuries to the head and neck
accounted for just under a fifth of the injuries sustained. Within
each of the injury categories, open wounds, fractures and frag-
mentation/shrapnel wounds were the most common types of
injury regardless of the body region affected. Explosions (which
include improvised explosive devices and mines) were the
leading mechanism of injury for BI, followed by small arms fire
(which includes gunshot wounds and grenades). There were also
a small proportion of personnel injured by explosions and small
arms fire that were NBI injuries, such as negligent discharge.
NBI comprised a range of mechanism of injury including cli-
matic injuries, land transport accidents and slips, trips and
falls.20
These data collection systems have been generalised for all
future operations. Alongside the JTTR, the DMS is developing
datasets to capture the hospital workload from disease and NBI.
THE NINE THEMES REQUIRED TO INSTITUTIONALISE,
RETAIN OR SUPPORT THE NARRATIVE
The medical lessons analysis developed eight specific themes
that require further work to institutionalise, retain or support
the golden thread. These too are a synthesis of all the recorded
lessons and insights, and impact on the totality of the OPCP
and within the capabilities of operational healthcare defined in
medical doctrine. They are set out below and are not
prioritised.
The medical command and control structure must be
appropriately resourced to be effective
The medical command and control (C2) structure provides
medical planning, technical medical advice and governance of
the medical system to the chain of command.21 It is essential
that there is a clear relationship for technical command of the
medical function throughout the formal military command
structure.22 The initial deployment on Op TELIC had a full
complement of medical staff embedded in every headquarters
from Brigade to Theatre level. This rapidly drew down into a
unified medical group with a medical staff branch in the
commanding Divisional headquarters. On Op HERRICK, from
2006 to 2009 a single lieutenant colonel CO was responsible
for the entirety of deployed medical provision. The CO was
required to command tactically both a Role 3 Hospital and
a medical regiment and fulfil the role and responsibilities of a
theatre commander medical. This led to conflicts of interest, a
tactical focus to the CO’s area of responsibility and an inability
to step back, take an overview and rebalance medical resources
and effort effectively. From the middle of 2009, this function
was separated with a UK theatre commander medical within the
Headquarters Joint Force Support and independent subordinate
commands for the medical regiment and the hospital. The
NATO command structure had a medical staff branch in every
headquarters, although the medical adviser had limited formal
authority over medical units in Afghanistan because the majority
were national assets.23
It is essential that personnel assigned to the medical C2 struc-
ture are properly trained for their role. This includes knowledge
of the medical contribution to the estimate process,24 25
methods to undertake casualty estimation26 27 and the methods
to manage the coordination of medical care on the battlefield.28
The assessment of the performance of the medical system is a
critical function. This is based on the dataset described in the
section on medical statistics and workload which should provide
an active feedback loop.29 It is likely to be augmented by
in-theatre datasets such as operational health surveillance
systems.30
The intensity of clinical operations in the hospital at Camp
BASTION on Op HERRICK demonstrated the need for a clear
clinical leadership function alongside the CO of the hospital.
This role developed into the Deployed Medical Director post as
formal appointment for the senior clinician that was separate
from a clinical consultant appointment.31 This post became
essential in leading the clinical team through challenging ethical
dilemmas in the provision of clinical care and the allocation of
clinical resources, particularly in the care of Afghan civilian
casualties.32 33
The requirement for clear medical C2 is explicit in Allied
Joint Medical Doctrine. The DMD role is established in all
deployable hospital units.
Develop multinational healthcare interoperability
Multinational medical provision on operations offers the advan-
tage of burden sharing between nations whose military forces
are sharing an operational area.23 34 Since 2009, the Bastion
Role 3 Hospital has demonstrated that a multinational-staffed
facility can deliver exceptional patient outcomes. This was based
on a Lead Nation defined through a formal Technical
Arrangement.35 This confirmed the UK command, the use of
DMS clinical protocols and made the hospital subject to DMS
Healthcare Governance and Assurance. Predictable cultural and
clinical differences between nations were partially mitigated
through combined training during the Role 3 Hospital’s
Mission Specific Validation (MSV). However, to ensure we
deliver the required quality of healthcare during the early stages
of future operations, we must invest in understanding potential
medical partners by developing and sharing with them our clin-
ical practices and protocols.
The Strategic Defence and Security Review 2016 emphasised
the importance of alliances and coalitions. The DMS future
international medical engagement strategy emphasises interoper-
ability in our partnership with alliance nations and is being
delivered through a programme of multinational combined exer-
cises and exchange visits.
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Develop healthcare record management and information
exchange/management functionality
The section on medical statistics and workload emphasises the
need for active management of healthcare records across the
OPCP. While strategic policy exists, experience on Op
HERRICK showed that a significant number of DMS staff did
not understand, or were unaware of the individual and corpor-
ate responsibilities (statutory, professional and ethical) associated
with healthcare records.36 This needs to be addressed through
more structured and didactic education of DMS personnel.
Better medical information systems (MIS) are required to ensure
the fidelity and timeliness of the transfer of primary healthcare
records to and from theatre, and that episodes of DHC are cap-
tured with the required accuracy.37 We must be able to exploit
clinical data more effectively. This has particular significance
with regard to force generation to prevent the deployment of
individuals with inappropriate medical conditions.38 The DMS
also needs to be able to communicate and transfer data, includ-
ing clinical data to conduct patient transfer between the UK
roles of healthcare, theatre and the Firm Base and with indigen-
ous, coalition, international agency and non-government organ-
isation healthcare providers.39 40
The MOD is investing in future MIS under the title of pro-
gramme CORTISONE,41 which will address these issues.
Battlespace headquarters require clinical decision support
for effective patient regulation
This lesson builds on the lesson concerning healthcare records
and information management. The Patient Evacuation Control
Cell (PECC) is the critical component of the medical system
that controls medical evacuation to ensure that the right
patient has the right clinical escort, is transported in the right
platform to the right destination in the right time for their
clinical condition.42 Effective MEDEVAC tasking requires clin-
ically qualified personnel to provide medical advice to the
‘ambulance despatch function’ on behalf of the battlespace
commander who authorises the assignment and movement of
MEDEVAC platforms, particularly when multiple MEDEVAC
capabilities are available.43 The PECC must be collocated
within the Joint Operations Centre (or equivalent) that tasks
and authorises the execution of MEDEVAC missions to
provide necessary situational awareness of the battlefield
environment.
These recommendations are explicit in Allied Joint Medical
Doctrine.
Exploit our expertise and experience in Role 3 training
validation to develop a comparable Role 1 process
Role 3 collective training has been institutionalised and appro-
priately resourced through a macrosimulation hospital exercise
(HOSPEX), which is a formal field training exercise with sup-
porting assessment methodologies including MSV. The utility
and benefits of HOSPEX have been demonstrated by post-
deployment and post-operational reports. It provides the exem-
plar process for delivery and assurance of the military field
hospital system before deployment and has facilitated the inte-
gration and orientation of multinational staff elements into the
UK practice. It is supported by a detailed, reproducible and
auditable mechanism of assuring and validating the hospital cap-
ability. The detail of HOSPEX was covered in a themed edition
of the Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps in 2008.44 This
system has been replicated by other nations45 and was critical to
the safe operation of the DMS Ebola Virus Treatment Facility
that was deployed to Sierra Leone in 2014.46
However, the method for Role 1 collective training and val-
idation was less institutionalised and less well resourced during
the Op TELIC/HERRICK period.47 48 The lessons analysis
identified the requirement to bring coherence and commonality
to the assessment and validation of pre-hospital care and
deployed hospital care collective training so they become a
single effective quality assurance process.49 This requires a
method to validate contingent medical capability effectively
across the OPCP and thereby provide the assurance it is capable
of delivering the required standard of healthcare throughout
the system.50 Following completion of the specific medical col-
lective training, medical units must also undertake generic col-
lective training with the formations they will support in order
to integrate and function effectively on the common
battlefield.51
All three services are developing pre-hospital care clinical val-
idation centres in which individuals and teams can have their
military and clinical skills assessed on a periodic basis.
The increasing relevance of military competencies
During Op TELIC and Op HERRICK, the majority of DMS
personnel, and in particular deployed hospital care staff,
deployed into a mature theatre with well-founded clinical, tech-
nical and living accommodation. They were not required to use
military skills such as counter-CBRN (chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear), countersurveillance and tactical move-
ment. Military skills will have increased relevance during future
operations and will be required of clinical staff to enable them
to deliver clinical care in the Future Operating Environment.52 53
Individual competence must be demonstrated through completion
of Mandatory Army Training Tests or the equivalent test for
Royal Navy or Royal Air Force. Clinical staff must regularly prac-
tise these competencies together in order to be ready for short
notice deployment.
Each service has mandatory predeployment training stan-
dards. Individual’s clinical performance is assessed during prede-
ployment validation.
Regularise Combat Medical Technician clinical exposure
within the Firm Base
Throughout Op TELIC and Op HERRICK, Army Combat
Medical Technicians (and their Royal Navy and Royal Air Force
equivalents) have demonstrated pre-hospital trauma skills but
the evidence of high-quality performance has not been strong54
and they have been relatively weak in providing primary health-
care.55–57 This is systemic and due to the challenge of providing
them with appropriate pre-deployment clinical exposure within
the Firm Base to develop the clinical experience and currency to
deliver high-quality pre-hospital healthcare on operations. The
requirement for appropriate clinical exposure must be forma-
lised and regularised.58
A new programme, the Defence Medic, has been introduced
to ensure military medics are trained to the same standard as
their NHS equivalent and to enable clinical placements within
NHS ambulance trusts and MOD medical centres.
Train to treat the entire operational patient suite
Op TELIC and Op HERRICK again demonstrated the diversity
and complexity of the patient population that required, and
will require, treatment on future operations within the UK
medical treatment facilities. There has been a continuous series
of reports that emphasise the requirement to have the skills and
clinical equipment to provide appropriate clinical care for
paediatric patients.14 59–61 The nature of the counterinsurgency
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campaigns on both operations also required the DMS to
provide clinical care for captured persons (CPERS).62 63 The
legal, ethical and clinical considerations for providing medical
support to CPERS proved to be so fundamentally different to
normal clinical practice that it was necessary to develop special
training in this subject and establish specific governance
arrangements to comply with International Humanitarian
Law.64
The DMS should be capable of providing appropriate clinical
care to the breadth of the defence population at risk that is
explicit in Allied Joint Medical Doctrine.
Mentoring indigenous healthcare systems and providers: the
medical contribution to wider campaign effects
The goal for an international counterinsurgency campaign is to
create the conditions for the indigenous government to have
sufficient political and military power to manage their own
security challenges. This is captured under by the concept of
Security Sector Reform, with an inevitable requirement to
ensure that the medical support to the indigenous security ser-
vices is sufficient to maintain the moral component of their
fighting power.65 While there was limited medical mentoring
for the Iraqi security forces in Basra, there is no record of a sys-
tematic plan in the public domain. In Afghanistan, medical
mentoring within 215 Corps (the Afghan National Army
(ANA) unit in Helmand) was limited to Combat Lifesaver train-
ing and tactical casualty evacuation training until late 2012. At
that point, it was recognised that an Afghan hospital facility
was required to replace the Bastion Role 3 hospital in order to
sustain the ANA’s will to fight. This could not be collocated
with the Afghan civilian hospital in the provincial centre in
Lashkar Gar due to security concerns. The UK provided the
significant majority of the hospital medical mentors to support
the establishment of an ANA surgical capability and treatment
facility in the 215 Corps main operating base. The experience
of supporting health sector development for the ANA recog-
nises that this requires specific knowledge based on a deep
understanding of the organisation of military medical
services across a wide range of political and economic
environments.66 67
Military medical services may also be a significant inter-
national contribution to the overall medical resources in a
complex emergency,68 however, there are recognised constraints
on the use of international medical forces in providing direct
medical care to the indigenous community, particularly outside
of hospital care.69 It is important for medical planners to care-
fully consider all possible consequences before committing to
medical civilian aid programmes (MEDCAPs).70 71 Military
medical services may be better focused on clinical training and
organisational advice alongside the wider international commu-
nity if there is a requirement to support civilian health sector
development.
This experience demonstrated the significance of the effect
medical mentorship can have in contributing to the develop-
ment of indigenous health sectors. The effect is applicable as
part of a stabilisation operation and is also eminently suitable as
a discrete, politically low-risk and publicly supportable contribu-
tion to our Defence Engagement strategy. The DMS must estab-
lish as a core competence, the development of indigenous
security forces’ medical services within the wider military task
of upstream capacity building within a Joint Interagency
Intergovernmental Multinational approach.
These requirements have been captured in a Joint Doctrine
Note titled ‘The Military Medical Contribution to Security and
Stabilisation’.72 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)
2016 funded the creation of a Centre for Defence Healthcare
Engagement to act as a focus for lessons and training in this
area.
TRANSFERRED LESSONS
In addition to the organisational lessons described above, the
analysis identified four additional themes that require action in
consultation with wider stakeholders. While the medical services
provide technical advice on Force Health Protection, it is the
engineer branch that sets the requirement for Expeditionary
Campaign Infrastructure (ECI). This must have appropriate field
sanitation and hygiene equipment in order to minimise trans-
missible disease risks. Medical logistics underpins all medical
care. However, in the UK, medical logistics is considered to be a
subordinate task of the logistic services. The medical supply
chain must be robust, effective and efficient, managed by per-
sonnel with relevant experience and underpinned by endorsed
medical supply doctrine. Aligned to this, the medical services
require the logisticians to deliver a robust and effective mechan-
ism, underpinned by policy, for clinical waste management from
all clinical facilities during contingency operations. Finally, many
lessons were learned about providing sensitive and effective
mortuary services including repatriation arrangements, clinical
support to inquests and providing a feedback loop to improve
the physical protection of service personnel from ballistic
threats.73–75
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
This paper provides the definitive record of the organisational
lessons learned by the Defence Medical Services from the cam-
paigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have a duty to our patients
to ensure that we continue the same standard of professional
inquiry into the performance and evolution of the military
medical system for all future military operations. This has been
reflected in the DMS approach to capture the lessons from our
contribution to the international response to the Ebola crisis,
Op GRITROCK.76 Between operations, we must ensure that
operational experience is transferred across generations and that
we constantly test our assertions against developments in clinical
practice in the civilian sector and the experience of other
nations on military operations. Our concepts and doctrine need
to be continually reviewed and communicated to our DMS
personnel.77
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